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Abstract
We study mechanism design problems in the ordinal setting wherein the preferences of agents are
described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them.
This setting is relevant when agents can compare outcomes, but aren’t able to evaluate precise utilities
for them. Such a situation arises in diverse contexts including voting and matching markets.
Our paper addresses two issues that arise in ordinal mechanism design. To design social welfare
maximizing mechanisms, one needs to be able to quantitatively measure the welfare of an outcome which
is not clear in the ordinal setting. Second, since the impossibility results of Gibbard and Satterthwaite [15,
25] force one to move to randomized mechanisms, one needs a more nuanced notion of truthfulness.
We propose rank approximation as a metric for measuring the quality of an outcome, which allows us
to evaluate mechanisms based on worst-case performance, and lex-truthfulness as a notion of truthfulness
for randomized ordinal mechanisms. Lex-truthfulness is stronger than notions studied in the literature,
and yet flexible enough to admit a rich class of mechanisms circumventing classical impossibility results.
We demonstrate the usefulness of the above notions by devising lex-truthful mechanisms achieving good
rank-approximation factors, both in the general ordinal setting, as well as structured settings such as
(one-sided) matching markets, and its generalizations, matroid and scheduling markets.
1 Introduction
A central problem in social choice theory and mechanism design is that of choosing a “good” outcome
by aggregating individuals’ private preferences over outcomes, where individuals are rational agents. A
mechanism implementing a social choice function (SCF) needs to elicit the preferences of agents in a truthful
fashion, that is, in a way such that no agent may benefit by misreporting his preferences.
In this paper, we study mechanism-design problems in ordinal settings, wherein the preferences are
described by orderings over the set of outcomes. This is in contrast with the cardinal setting, wherein an
agent specifies a value to each outcome (which determines his preferences). Ordinal settings reduce the
“informational burden” on an agent in the sense that he only needs to be able to compare outcomes rather
than assign values to outcomes justifying his preferences. It is not hard to imagine settings where the former
comparison task is easier, and more aptly describes the situation: examples span the spectrum between
electoral settings and the setting of allocating dormitory rooms to students.
Two immediate issues arise in ordinal mechanism design. A typical mechanism-design goal is to max-
imize social welfare, but in order to approach this goal in ordinal settings, one needs to first be able to
quantitatively measure the social-welfare value of an outcome. Second, since the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
(GS) impossibility result [15, 25] precludes non-trivial deterministic truthful mechanisms, one is forced to
move to randomized mechanisms for which one needs a more nuanced notion of truthfulness.
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1.1 Our contributions
We propose a novel framework for welfare-maximization and truthfulness for randomized ordinal mecha-
nisms, and devise various near-optimal mechanisms in this framework. Our contributions are threefold.
1) We introduce a metric called rank approximation for measuring the quality of an outcome, which in
turn allows us to evaluate mechanisms in terms of their worst-case performance. We show that rank
approximation is a robust notion that is appealing, and can be motivated, from various perspectives.
2) We propose a truthfulness notion called lex-truthfulness for randomized ordinal mechanisms. This is
stronger than a notion studied in the literature, and yet flexible enough that it admits a rich class of mech-
anisms bypassing classical impossibility results. We provide a characterization result for lex-truthfulness,
which we leverage to obtain lex-truthful mechanisms for various ordinal settings. We believe that this
characterization will find application beyond the specific applications that we consider in this paper.
3) We demonstrate the usefulness of the above two notions by devising lex-truthful mechanisms achieving
good rank-approximation factors both in the general ordinal setting, as well as structured settings such as
(one-sided) matching markets, and its generalizations, matroid and scheduling markets.
We now elaborate on our contributions. Let n and m denote the number of agents and number of outcomes
respectively, and ≻j denote agent j’s ordering over outcomes, which we assume is strict and complete (i.e.,
for any two outcomes o, o′, either o ≻j o′ or vice versa).
Rank approximation (Section 3.1) We say that an outcome o has rank approximation α for preference
profile ≻, if for every position r, the number of agents having o as one of their top-r outcomes is at least
1
α
· maxrankr(≻), where maxrankr(≻) denotes maxoˆ(number of agents having oˆ as one of their top-r
outcomes). An α-rank-approximation mechanism is one that always returns an α-rank-approximate out-
come. While the requirement of simultaneously approximating maxrankr(≻) for all r seems too stringent,
and even the existence of an α-rank-approximate outcome o, for non-trivial α, seems doubtful, promisingly
(as we elaborate later), we can achieve a 2-rank-approximation for matching and matroid markets, and a
randomized O(log n)-rank-approximation for general ordinal settings.
Rank approximation is a natural, purely ordinal notion with various desirable properties. Consider any
cardinal-utility profile ~U = (U1, . . . , Un), where each Uj is consistent with ≻j , that is, Uj(o) > Uj(o′) iff
o ≻j o′. Call such a utility profile homogeneous, if for all r = 1, . . . ,m, all Ujs assign the same value
to their r-th ranked outcome. An α-rank-approximation outcome o for ≻ is such that for any consistent
homogeneous utility profile ~U , its social welfare,
∑n
j=1 Uj(o), for ~U is at least a
1
α
-fraction of the optimum
social welfare for ~U . Thus, an α-rank-approximation mechanism simultaneously yields an α-approximation
to the optimum social-welfare for all consistent homogeneous utility profiles (Theorem 3.2).
Consistent homogeneous utilities are also known as scoring rules [31] (also sometimes called positional
scoring roles). A scoring rule assigns a score to each position and returns the outcome with highest total
score; a prominent example is the Borda rule, which gives a score of m−k to the k-th position. An outcome
is α-approximate with respect to a scoring rule, if its score is at least a 1
α
-fraction of the score of any other
outcome. Translated to this setting, we obtain that an α-rank-approximation mechanism simultaneously
achieves an α-approximation to all scoring rules. In other words, given an α-rank-approximation mecha-
nism M, one need not be overly concerned about which scoring rule is most suited to the problem, since
M guarantees an α-approximation to all scoring rules!
To place these simultaneous-approximation bounds in perspective, it is useful to consider an even
stronger notion: say that a mechanism has “strong welfare factor” α, if for every consistent (even non-
homogeneous) cardinal-utility profile ~U , the mechanism returns an α-approximation to the optimum social
welfare for ~U . Not surprisingly, this notion is too strong: it is easy to show that no mechanism (deterministic
or randomized) can have any non-trivial strong welfare factor, even for matching markets.
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Lex-truthfulness (Section 3.2) The classic impossibility results of [15, 25] show that the space of deter-
ministic truthful mechanisms in general ordinal settings is extremely limited, forcing the move to random-
ized mechanisms. When seeking to define a notion of truthfulness for ordinal randomized mechanisms, one
immediately encounters the following issue: how should one extend an agent’s preferences over outcomes
to preferences over distributions of outcomes? The usual approach in the economics literature is to use the
stochastic dominance relation. Since this does not induce a total order over distributions, one obtains two
notions of truthfulness: (i) strong truthfulness [14], where the truth-telling distribution stochastically dom-
inates any distribution obtained via a misreport; and (ii) weak truthfulness [21, 7], where the truth-telling
distribution is not stochastically dominated by any distribution obtained via a misreport. Gibbard [14] gen-
eralized [15, 25] to show that the space of strongly-truthful mechanisms in general ordinal settings is also
limited, leaving weak-truthfulness as the only viable notion of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms.
We propose a new notion of truthfulness sandwiched (strictly) between the above two notions. A dis-
tribution p lex-dominates a distribution q with respect to ordering ≻, if, when considering outcomes in
decreasing order of their ranking in ≻, at the first outcome o where p and q differ, p assigns a higher proba-
bility to o than q. Note that lex-dominance induces a total order on distributions. We say that a mechanism
is lex-truthful (LT) if no distribution obtained by a misreport lex-dominates the truth-telling distribution.1
We show that lex-truthfulness provides us with ample flexibility in mechanism design and allows us to
circumvent Gibbard’s impossibility theorem. Call a social choice function (SCF) f fully lex-truthfully (LT)
implementable if for all ε > 0, there exists a lex-truthful mechanism that agrees with f with probability at
least (1− ε) on every preference profile. We isolate a property of an SCF, that we call pseudomonotonicity,
that completely characterizes LT-implementability of the SCF (Theorem 3.6). Roughly speaking, an SCF is
pseudomonotone if for any preference profile, if an agent j changes his ordering without altering his top k
choices, then the new outcome cannot both be a better outcome for j and a top-(k + 1) outcome for j (see
Definition 3.5).
This characterization turns out to be instrumental in making lex-truthfulness an amenable notion to work
with, and opens up a host of SCFs to full LT-implementation. We show that various rank-approximation
SCFs that we devise for matching, matroid, and scheduling markets—including the 2-rank-approximation
mechanism for matching markets mentioned earlier—are pseudomonotone. For general ordinal settings, we
identify a rich class of pseudomonotone SCFs which includes the plurality scoring rule. Thus, all of these
SCFs are fully LT-implementable. We view the characterization of lex-truthfulness via pseudomonotonicity
as one of our main contributions, which we believe will find further applications.
Matching, matroid, and scheduling markets (Sections 4 and 5) In addition to general ordinal mechanism-
design settings, we also consider various structured settings, and obtain lex-truthful mechanisms with good
rank-approximation factors.
Our most-compelling results are for matching markets (Section 4), which are one of the most well-
studied ordinal settings (see, e.g., the surveys [30, 1]). Here, we have n agents and m items, and outcomes
are matchings of agents to items. Each agent has a strict preference over items, which induces preferences
over matchings based on the item the agent is assigned in a matching. Observe that agents are indifferent
over outcomes that give them the same item. The room allocation problem is an instance of this market.
We devise a simple deterministic 2-rank-approximation pseudomonotone algorithm MaxMatch (The-
orem 4.1), which is therefore fully LT-implementable. In contrast, we show in Appendix B that various
common algorithms proposed for matching markets, such as the top-trading-cycle algorithm, randomized
serial dictatorship, probabilistic serial, all have rank approximation at least Ω(
√
n). We prove a matching
lower bound of 2 on the rank-approximation factor of deterministic SCFs (Theorem 4.2), and obtain super-
constant lower bounds on the rank-approximation factor achievable by deterministic truthful mechanisms.
1We have recently learned that this notion was independently proposed by Cho [10], who called it DL-strategyproofness.
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The 2-rank-approximation for matching markets extends to matroid markets (Theorem 4.6), which is the
generalization where we have a matroid on the agent-set for every item, and the (possibly multiple) agents
assigned to an item are required to form an independent set in that item’s matroid. Besides the increased
modeling power of matroids, this turns out to be a key component of our algorithms for scheduling markets.
In Section 5, we consider scheduling markets. Here the agents are jobs that need to be assigned to
machines. Each job has a private ordering over the machines, and a public processing time on each machine,
and there is makespan bound T that limits the amount of time available on each machine. An outcome is
a partial assignment of some jobs to machines satisfying the makespan bound. This can be viewed as
the matching problem with a knapsack constraint. For parallel machines, we obtain an LT-mechanism that
always returns anO(log n)-rank-approximation schedule withO(T ) makespan, and we show that this bound
is tight (Theorems 5.2 and 5.3). We also obtain an O(log n)-rank approximation for unrelated machines
(Theorem 5.4), albeit not via an LT mechanism.
1.2 Other related work
The conundrum of social welfare in ordinal mechanisms, which probably has its origins in the Condorcet
paradox [11] that states that it may so happen that a majority of agents prefer outcome a to b, outcome b to
c, and outcome c to a, was cemented by Arrow’s impossibility theorem [4]. Subsequent to Arrow’s result,
much of the work in social choice theory has focused on Pareto optimality as the sole notion of efficiency
for ordinal mechanisms.
Recent work, mostly in the CS literature, has led to a more nuanced notion of efficiency. Procaccia and
Rosenchein [23] studied the strong welfare factor notion (that they call distortion), and noticed that deter-
ministic mechanisms have unbounded distortion. Boutilier et al. [8] proposed randomized mechanisms and
showed that the strong welfare factor is at most O(
√
m log∗m), if the consistent cardinal-utility profile is
normalized. In contrast, our rank approximation results imply O(log n)-approximate outcomes, but under
a stronger restriction on the consistent cardinal utilities. The notion of approximations to scoring rules was
studied by Procaccia [22] where he described strongly truthful mechanisms which 2-approximate Borda, but
O(
√
m)-approximate the plurality rule. In contrast, our (non-truthful) mechanism O(log n)-rank approxi-
mates any scoring rule, and plurality can be arbitrarily well approximated by a lex-truthful mechanism.
Another notion of social welfare in ordinal mechanisms, called ordinal welfare factor (OWF), was re-
cently proposed by Bhalgat et al [6]. A mechanism has OWF β ∈ [0, 1] if for any outcome o, at least βn
agents prefer the outcome returned by the mechanism to o. This is in fact a quantification of the notion
of popular outcomes; an outcome is popular if a majority prefer it to any other fixed outcome. Note that
popular outcomes have OWF of at least 0.5. A popular outcome may not exist, but a popular distribution
over outcomes always does. Popular outcomes were studied by economists in the matching setting [13], and
as strict maximal lotteries in the general setting [12, 18]; subsequently, a large body of literature has been
developed by computer scientists on popular matchings [2, 17, 16, 19]. The notions of rank approximation
and OWF (and therefore the notion of popularity) are incomparable. That is, there are outcomes with “good”
OWF and “bad” rank approximation, and vice-versa.
Subsequent to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result, researchers focused on design of randomized mecha-
nisms. As mentioned above, this led to differing notions of truthfulness. Strong truthfulness was proposed
by Gibbard [14]. Postlewaite and Schmeidler [21] proposed weak truthfulness and proved that no weakly
truthful mechanism on 4 or more outcomes, can be (ex ante) Pareto optimal if agents are allowed to have
priors on their (own) preferences. Subsequently, Aziz et al [5] removed the prior condition, but prove im-
possibility of only certain kinds of mechanism. We remark that our lex-truthful mechanisms, which are
also weakly truthful, do not contradict these results, since our mechanisms are not Pareto optimal. How-
ever, our mechanisms are ε-implementations of Pareto-optimal SCFs, so they satisfy Pareto optimality with
probability at least 1 − ε. Thus, we bypass the above impossibility results while sacrificing a modicum of
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Pareto-optimality.
Matching markets are one of the most widely studied examples of the ordinal setting. There is a vast
amount of literature, and we point to excellent surveys [24, 30, 1]. In Appendix B, we describe three well
known mechanisms in this setting. These are the random serial dictatorship, Gale’s top trading cycle algo-
rithm [27], and the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism [7]. The first two mechanisms are at least strongly
truthful. PS is weakly truthful, and we show that it is lex-truthful as well; this was also independently
shown by [10, 29]. However, we show that all these three mechanisms have rank approximation as bad
as Ω(
√
n). In contrast, we obtain a fully LT-implementable 2-rank-approximation mechanism using our
pseudomonotone 2-rank-approximation algorithm MaxMatch.
2 Preliminaries
In the general ordinal mechanism design setting, we have a set N of n agents, and a set O of m outcomes
(or alternatives). We use the terms agent and player interchangeably. Each agent j ∈ N has a private
complete preference list or ordering j over outcomes, that is, o j o′ or o′ j o for every o, o′ ∈ O. This
is typically referred to as ordinal utilities/preferences, to distinguish them from cardinal utilities wherein
the utility function assigns a value to each outcome. Let Σj denote the publicly-known set of allowed
preference lists for agent j, and Σ :=
∏n
j=1Σj . A preference profile is a combination = (1, . . . ,n)
of agents’ preference lists. For k ∈ Z+, we use [k] to denote the set {1, . . . , k}. A preference list is called
strict, and denoted ≻, if there are no indifferences: exactly one of o ≻ o′ and o′ ≻ o holds for every two
distinct outcomes o, o′ ∈ O. Given a strict preference ≻, we will sometimes say o  o′ to denote that
o ≻ o′ or o = o′. Given a preference list ≻, let alt(≻, r) ∈ O denote the r-th ranked outcome in ≻, and
pos(≻, o) ∈ [m] denote the rank of outcome o in ≻. For a tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn), we use x−j to denote
(x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn). Similarly, let Σ−j :=
∏
k 6=j Σk.
In addition to the general setting mentioned above, we consider three specific mechanism-design set-
tings in this paper: one-sided matching markets, which have been studied extensively in the literature (see,
e.g., [30, 1]) and two generalizations of these, matroid markets and scheduling markets, that we introduce.
Matching markets (Section 4) We nave n agents and m items. Each agent j has a strict preference ≻j
over the m items. The outcomes are matchings of agents to items. We say that an outcome M assigns an
agent j the “null” item ∅ to denote that he is not assigned an item in M ; we set i ≻j ∅ for every item i. An
agent is indifferent between matchings M and M ′ if they allot him the same item (counting ∅ as an item),
and otherwise, prefers M to M ′ if he prefers the item allotted to him in M to the item allotted to him in M ′.
Matroid markets (Section 4.1) We again have n agents who have a strict preference over m items. We
also have a matroid Mi = (N,Ii) on the set N of agents, for each item i ∈ [m]. An outcome is an allocation
that assigns at most one item to each agent j such that, for each item i, the set of agents allotted item i is an
independent set of Mi. Note that multiple agents may be allocated the same item. An agent’s ordering over
outcomes is induced by his ordering of the items as in the setting of matching-markets. It is easy to see that
a matching market is the special case where Mi encodes that at most one agent may be assigned to item i.
Scheduling markets (Section 5) The agents are n jobs that need to be scheduled on m machines, where
the machines are in general unrelated. Each job j possesses a private strict complete preference order ≻j
over the machines, and has a publicly-known processing time pij on machine i. Furthermore, there is a bound
T on the maximum load allowed on any machine (i.e., makespan). An outcome is an (partial) assignment
of some jobs to machines that respects the makespan bound. The ordering over outcomes is induced by the
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ordering over machines as in the above two cases. The parallel machines setting is the case where pij = pj
for every machine i and job j.
Note that in the above three markets, agents’ preferences over outcomes are not strict; however, for each
agent j, the outcome-set may be partitioned into indifference classes such that j is indifferent between the
outcomes in an indifference class, and has a strict ordering over the indifference classes. Our framework
and results apply to such settings with cosmetic notational changes (see Section 3.3), but we stick for the
most part to the setting of strict preferences for notational ease.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Σ 7→ O. In settings with no monetary transfers, there is
no formal distinction between an SCF and a deterministic algorithm or direct-revelation mechanism, which
maps the preference profile given by the agents’ reported preference lists to an outcome. An SCF f is said
to be implementable or truthful if for every player j, every ≻j ,≻′j∈ Σj , and every ≻−j∈ Σ−j , we have
f(≻j,≻−j) j f(≻′j,≻−j); that is, no agent benefits by misreporting his preference list.
A randomized mechanism is allowed to output a distribution (also called a lottery) over outcomes. Let
L(O) denote the collection of distributions over the outcome-set O. A randomized mechanism is formally
then a function mapping preference profiles to distributions in L(O). We sometimes refer to a mechanism
that works with ordinal preferences as an ordinal mechanism.
Definition 2.1. A randomized mechanism M is said to ε-implement an SCF f (or that f is ε-implementable
by M), if Pr[M(≻) = f(≻)] ≥ 1 − ε for all ≻∈ Σ, where the probability is over the random choices of
M. We say that a family {Mε} of mechanisms fully implements f if for all ε > 0, Mε ε-implements f .
(This is in the same spirit as the notion of virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium [20, 3].)
Truthfulness for randomized mechanisms may be defined in various ways. The strongest notion is
universal truthfulness, wherein a randomized truthful mechanism is a randomization (or mixture) over de-
terministic truthful mechanisms, where the mixture weights are input-independent. A somewhat weaker
notion is obtained by considering the stochastic dominance relation. Given an ordering ≻ over O, and
two lotteries p,q ∈ L(O), we say that p (first-order) stochastically dominates q with respect to ≻, if∑
ℓ≤i p(alt(≻, ℓ)) ≥
∑
ℓ≤i q(alt(≻, ℓ)) for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Since stochastic dominance does not induce
a total ordering on L(O), this yields two notions of truthfulness that have been studied in the literature.
Definition 2.2. A randomized mechanism M is said to be:
• strongly truthful [14]: ifM(≻j,≻−j) stochastically dominates M(≻′j,≻−j) with respect to≻j , for
all j, all ≻j,≻′j∈ Σj , and all ≻−j∈ Σ−j .
• weakly truthful [21, 7]: ifM(≻j ,≻−j) is not stochastically dominated byM(≻′j ,≻−j) with respect
to ≻j , for all j, all ≻j ,≻′j∈ Σj , and all ≻−j∈ Σ−j .
A universally truthful mechanism is also strongly truthful, and in fact, this inclusion is strict (Theo-
rem 3.4). Gibbard [14] extended the impossibility result of [15, 25] to show that the space of strongly
truthful mechanisms is also rather limited. A deterministic mechanism is: (i) dictatorial if there exists
j ∈ N such that the mechanism’s output is always j’s top choice; and (ii) duple if the mechanism’s range
f(Σ) consists of at most two outcomes. A (deterministic or randomized) mechanism is unilateral if there
exists some fixed j ∈ N such that the mechanism’s output depends only on j’s (reported) preference list.
Theorem 2.3. (Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Gibbard impossibility results) (i) If m ≥ 3 and f(Σ) = O, then
f is truthful iff it is dictatorial. (ii) Any strongly truthful mechanism is a mixture of truthful unilateral and
deterministic truthful duple mechanisms with input-independent mixture weights.
Theorem 2.3 leaves weak truthfulness as the only notion that potentially allows for some sophisticated
mechanisms. In Section 3.2, we propose a stronger notion of truthfulness and show that this is flexible
enough that one can bypass Gibbard’s impossibility result and obtain various interesting mechanisms includ-
ing, in particular, mechanisms that yield “good” social welfare under the metric we introduce in Section 3.1.
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3 Rank approximation and Lex-truthfulness
3.1 Welfare in ordinal settings: rank approximation
We introduce a notion of social welfare that we call rank approximation. Given a preference profile≻= (≻1
, . . . ,≻n), the i-rank of an outcome o ∈ O in ≻, denoted ranki(o;≻), is the number of agents having o in
their top i choices: ranki(o;≻) =
∣∣{j : pos(≻j, o) ≤ i}∣∣. Define maxranki(≻) := maxo∈O ranki(o;≻).
Definition 3.1. A randomized mechanism M is an α-rank-approximation mechanism, if for every prefer-
ence profile ≻, we have E[ranki(M(≻);≻)] ≥ maxranki(≻)/α for all i = 1, . . . ,m, where the expecta-
tion is taken over the random choices of M. We say that α is the rank-approximation factor of M.
As mentioned in the Introduction, rank approximation is an appealingly robust notion from various
perspectives. A utility function U is consistent with a preference ordering ≻ if U(o) > U(o′) whenever
o ≻ o′. A collection of cardinal utility functions (U1, . . . , Un) consistent with a preference profile ≻ is
called homogeneous if for all i ∈ [m], the value that an agent assigns to his i-th choice is the same across all
agents, that is, Uj(alt(≻j, i)) = Uj′(alt(≻j′ , i)) for all i ∈ [m], j, j′ ∈ N .
An α-rank-approximation mechanism yields an α approximation to social welfare for any homogeneous
cardinal-utility profile consistent with the agents’ preferences.
Theorem 3.2. Let M be an α-rank-approximation randomized mechanism. Then, for every preference
profile ≻, we have E[∑j∈N Uj(M(≻))] ≥ 1α ·maxo∈O∑j∈N Uj(o) for any homogeneous utility profile
(U1, . . . , Un) consistent with ≻.
Proof. Let p = M(≻). Let U(i) be the common value of Uj(alt(≻j , i)). Define rank0(o;≻) = 0 for all
o ∈ O, and U(m+ 1) = 0. Let o∗ = argmaxo∈O
∑
j∈N Uj(o). Then E
[∑
j∈N Uj
(M(≻))] is
∑
o∈O
p(o)
m∑
i=1
(
ranki(o;≻)− ranki−1(o;≻)
)
U(i) =
∑
o∈O
p(o)
m∑
i=1
ranki(o;≻)
(
U(i)− U(i+ 1))
=
m∑
i=1
(
U(i)− U(i+ 1))E[ranki(M(≻);≻)] ≥ 1
α
·
m∑
i=1
(
U(i)− U(i+ 1)) ranki(o∗;≻) = 1
α
·
∑
j∈N
Uj(o
∗).

Consistent homogeneous utilities may be equivalently viewed as a scoring rule; Viewed from this
perspective, Theorem 3.2 shows that an α-rank-approximation mechanism simultaneously achieves an α-
approximation to all scoring rules.
In fact, rank approximation satisfies an even more general robustness property. Associate with each
outcome o an m-vector called its histogram, given by hist(o;≻) = {ranki(o;≻)}i∈[m]. Then the rank-
approximation factor of an outcome o is g
(
hist(o;≻);≻), where g(x;≻) := mini∈[m] ximaxranki(≻) . It is
not hard to see that g is a concave function of x and non-decreasing in each coordinate. A deterministic
α-rank-approximation mechanism outputs an outcome o whose g-value, g
(
hist(o;≻);≻), is at least 1
α
for
every input ≻.
Now suppose h(x;≻) is any concave non-decreasing function and we measure the value of an outcome o
by h
(
hist(o;≻);≻). This yields a natural SCF fh, where fh(≻) is
argmaxo′∈O h
(
hist(o′;≻);≻). Note that scoring rules correspond to the special case where h(·) is lin-
ear with all coefficients non-negative. Analogous to α-rank-approximation, we can define an SCF f ′ to be
an α-approximation for fh if (h-value of f ′(≻)) ≥ 1
α
· (h-value of fh(≻)) for all ≻.
An deterministic α-rank-approximation mechanism simultaneously achieves an α-approximation mech-
anism for all such histogram-based concave SCFs: if o is the outcome returned, we have hist(o;≻) ≥
1
α
· hist(o′;≻) coordinate-wise for any o′ ∈ O. Since h is non-decreasing and concave, this implies that
h
(
hist(o;≻);≻) ≥ 1
α
·maxo′∈O h
(
hist(o′;≻);≻) = 1
α
· fh(≻).
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3.2 Truthfulness for randomized ordinal mechanisms: lex-truthfulness
We propose a new notion for truthfulness relying on lexicographic ordering. Given an ordering ≻ over O,
and two lotteries p 6= q ∈ L(O), p lexicographically dominates q with respect to ≻, if there exists i ∈ [m]
such that p(alt(≻, i)) > q(alt(≻, i)) and p(alt(≻, ℓ)) = p(alt(≻, ℓ)) for all ℓ = 1, . . . , i − 1. Note that
lex-dominance imposes a total order on L(O). This motivates the following definition of truthfulness.
Definition 3.3. A randomized mechanismM is called lex-truthful (LT) if for all j ∈ N , all≻j,≻′j∈ Σj , and
all ≻−j , we have that either M(≻j ,≻−j) = M(≻′j ,≻−j), or M(≻j ,≻−j) lexicographically dominates
M(≻′j ,≻−j) with respect to ≻j .
Observe that if p stochastically dominates q, then p lex-dominates q as well. Since lex-dominance is a
total order, this implies that if p lex-dominates q, then q cannot stochastically dominate p. We obtain the
following hierarchy between the various notions of truthfulness for randomized ordinal mechanisms.
Theorem 3.4. Let UnivT, StrongT, WeakT, LexT denote the classes of universally-, strongly-, weakly-,
and lex- truthful mechanisms respectively. Then UnivT ( StrongT ( LexT (WeakT.
We defer the proof of Theorem 3.4 to Appendix A. We shorten “implementable by a lex-truthful mech-
anism” to “lex-truthfully (LT) implementable” in the sequel. We show that lex-truthful implementability
is equivalent to a property of the social-choice function that we call pseudomonotonicity. This character-
ization immediately opens up a host of SCFs that are fully LT-implementable. We heavily exploit this in
Sections 4 and 5 to show that the rank-approximation SCFs that we devise for various problems are fully
LT-implementable. In Section 6, we leverage this to show that an interesting class of SCFs in general ordinal
settings are fully LT-implementable.
Definition 3.5. A social choice function f is pseudomonotone (or satisfies pseudomonotonicity) if the fol-
lowing holds. Consider any player j, ≻−j∈ Σ−j , and ≻j,≻′j∈ Σj . Let o = f(≻) and o′ = f(≻′). Then,
either (i) o j o′, or (ii) there is an outcome o′′ such that o′′ ≻j o′ and pos(≻j, o′′) < pos(≻′j , o′′).
A useful way to view pseudomonotonicity is as follows: if a player’s deviation leaves his first k prefer-
ences unaltered, then the deviation cannot both yield him a better outcome and a top-(k + 1) outcome.
Theorem 3.6. (i) Let f be a pseudomonotone SCF. Then f is ε-implementable by a lex-truthful mechanism
for any ε > 0; that is, f is fully lex-truthfully implementable.
(ii) Conversely, if f is ε-LT implementable for some ε < 12 , then f is pseudomonotone.
Proof. First consider part (i). Given ε > 0, one can find ε1 > ε2 > · · · > εm > 0 such that
∑
i εi = ε.
Consider the randomized mechanism M that on input ≻, returns f(≻) with probability (1 − ε), and with
probability ε it chooses a random agent a and returns his i-th preference with probability εi/ε.
It is clear by definition that M ε-implements f . To prove lex-truthfulness, fix an agent j and consider
any ≻′= (≻′j,≻−j), where ≻′j 6=≻j . Let o = f(≻) and let o′ = f(≻′). Also let p =M(≻), q =M(≻′).
Let 1(A) be 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise. For any outcome oˆ, we have
p(oˆ)− q(oˆ) = 1
n
(
εpos(≻j ,oˆ) − εpos(≻′j ,oˆ)
)
+ 1(oˆ = o) · (1− ε)− 1(oˆ = o′) · (1− ε).
Considering outcomes in the preference order of ≻j , let o′′ be the first outcome such that pos(≻j, o′′) 6=
pos(≻′j , o′′). Then pos(≻j, o′′) < pos(≻′j, o′′). By pseudomonotonicity of f , we know that o j o′ or
o′′ ≻j o′. In the latter case, we have p(oˆ) − q(oˆ) ≥ 0 for all oˆ j o′′ and p(o′′) − q(o′′) > 0, so we are
done. In the former case, if o = o′ or o′′ j o, then the same argument holds. So suppose o ≻j o′′ and
o ≻j o′. Then p(oˆ) − q(oˆ) ≥ 0 for all oˆ j o and p(o) − q(o) > 0, so again we are done. (Note that
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mechanism M maps distinct inputs to distinct lotteries, and therefore it satisfies a slightly stronger version
of lex-truthfulness: the truth-telling lottery lex-dominates (i.e., is strictly superior to) a lottery obtained via
a misreport.)
We now prove part (ii). Let M be an LT mechanism that ε-LT implements f , where ε < 12 . Suppose
for a contradiction, there is some agent j, and ≻= (≻j,≻−j) and ≻′= (≻′j ,≻−j) such that o = f(≻) and
o′ = f(≻′) violate the conditions for pseudomonotonicity. That is, we have o′ ≻j o and for every outcome
o′′ ≻j o′, we have pos(≻j, o′′) ≥ pos(≻′j , o′′). This means that pos(≻j, o′′) = pos(≻′j , o′′) for all o′′ ≻j o′.
Let p =M(≻) and q =M(≻′).
Since M ε-LT implements f , we have p(o′) ≤ ε and q(o′) ≥ 1 − ε, so p(o′) < q(o′). Let o1, . . . , or
be the outcomes o′′ such that o′′ ≻j o′ listed in decreasing preference order according to ≻j . Since
pos(≻j , o′′) = pos(≻′j , o′′) for all o′′ ≻j o′, we have oℓ ≻′j o′ for all ℓ ∈ [r], and the ordering of the
oℓs is the same in ≻j and ≻′j . We claim that p(oℓ) = q(oℓ) for all ℓ = 1, . . . , r, which contradicts the fact
that M is lex-truthful.
We prove the claim by induction on ℓ. Considering ≻j to be j’s true preference list, we must have
p(o1) ≥ q(o1), and considering ≻′j to be j’s true preference list, we must have q(o1) ≥ p(o1). Suppose
that p(ok) = q(ok) for k = 1, . . . , ℓ− 1. Again considering ≻j and ≻′j be j’s true preference lists in turn,
we obtain that p(oℓ) = q(oℓ). 
3.3 Settings with indifferences
As noted earlier, many of the settings we consider involve non-strict preferences. In these settings, the out-
come set is partitioned into indifference classes Oj1, . . . , Ojmj for each agent j. Agent j is indifferent between
any two outcomes in the same indifference class, and has a strict complete ordering over his indifference
classes that specifies his ordering between two outcomes in different classes. Formally, given j∈ Σj , we
define pos(j, o) = r ∈ [mj ] if o lies in the indifference class of j ranked r under j , and alt(j, r) ⊆ O
is now the indifference class of j ranked r under j (that is, {o : pos(, o) = r}). The preferences induced
over outcomes are then: o j o′ iff pos(j, o) ≤ pos(j , o′), and o ≻j o′ iff pos(j , o) < pos(j, o′).
Say that o ∼j o′ if o and o′ belong to the same indifference class of j.
One requires mostly notational changes to extend our framework and results to this more-general setting.
With the above notation in place, the definitions of ranki(o;) (as |{j : pos(j, o) ≤ i}|, maxranki(≻),
rank-approximation (Definition 3.1) and pseudomonotonicity (Definition 3.5) remain unchanged.
We extend lex-dominance and lex-truthfulness as follows. Since players have indifference classes it
is not meaningful to consider probabilities assigned to individual outcomes. Instead, we aggregate the
probability assigned to an indifference class and define lex-dominance and lex-truthfulness by considering
these aggregate probability vectors. Given a lottery p ∈ L(O) and S ⊆ O, define p(S) := ∑o∈S p(o).
and let p′ be the aggregated probability vector
(
p′(j, r) := p(Ojr)
)
j∈N,r∈[mj ]
. Given j∈ Σj , and lotteries
p 6= q ∈ L(O), we say that p lex-dominates q with respect to j if there exists r ∈ [mj ] such that
p′(j, r) > q′(j, r) and p′(j, ℓ) = q′(j, ℓ) for all ℓ = 1, . . . , r − 1. Then, as in Definition 3.3, a mechanism
M is lex-truthful if for all , all j ∈ N and all ′j∈ Σj , either the aggregated probability vectors of M(≻)
and M(′j ,−j) are equal, or M(≻) lex-dominates M(′j,−j) with respect to j .
We can now mimic the proof of Theorem 3.6 to prove the following analogue for the above setting,
showing that pseudomonotonicity is necessary and sufficient for full LT-implementability. The proof appears
in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.7. (i) Let f be a pseudomonotone SCF. Then f is fully lex-truthfully implementable.
(ii) Conversely, if f is ε-lex-truthfully implementable for some ε < 12 , then f is pseudomonotone.
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4 Matching markets
Recall that in a matching market there are n agents and m items, and outcomes are matchings of agents to
items. Each agent j has a strict total ordering over items, which induces his preferences over outcomes: j
prefers outcome o to o′ if he prefers his allotted item in o to the one in o′.
We show in Appendix B that various common mechanisms proposed in the literature for matching mar-
kets all have bad rank approximation. In contrast, we devise a simple deterministic algorithm, MaxMatch,
that is a pseudomonotone, 2-rank-approximation algorithm, and hence, yields an LT mechanism (Theo-
rem 4.1). We complement this by showing two lower bounds. Theorem 4.2 shows that 2 is the best rank
approximation achievable by any deterministic algorithm, proving the tightness of our positive result. Next,
Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate limitations of deterministic truthful mechanisms for matching markets
by showing that such mechanisms cannot achieve any constant rank approximation.
Algorithm MaxMatch Fix a tie-breaking rule over agents. On input ≻, MaxMatch allocates items to
agents in m stages. In stage r, we consider the bipartite graph Gr with agents and items as vertices, and
an edge from agent j to item i, if i is a top-r item of agent j. Note that maxrankr(≻) is precisely the size
of the maximum matching in Gr. Let M denote the current matching of agents to items (which is ∅ when
r = 1), which is a matching in Gr . We maintain that at the beginning of stage r, M is a maximal matching
in Gr−1; observe this is true when r = 1. Since M is a maximal matching in Gr−1, an agent has an edge to
at most one item in Gr \M , where Gr \M is the graph obtained from Gr by deleting the nodes matched
by M . For every unmatched item i that has non-zero degree in Gr \M (i.e., i is an unmatched item that is a
top-r item of some unmatched agent) we use our tie-breaking rule to pick an agent j ∈ Gr \M ; we assign
item i to j and update M . Thus, M is updated to a maximal matching in Gr . We output the matching at the
end of m stages.
Theorem 4.1. MaxMatch a pseudomonotone, 2-rank approximation algorithm for matching markets, and
hence is fully LT-implementable.
Proof. The 2-rank-approximation guarantee of MaxMatch follows immediately from the fact that MaxMatch
maintains a maximal matching in the “top-r” graph Gr for all r, and the size of any maximal matching is at
least half the size of a maximum matching, and thus at least maxrankr(≻)/2.
Fix an agent j. Suppose that j deviates from≻j to≻′j without altering his top-r items and their ordering,
that is, alt(≻j , ℓ) = alt(≻′j, ℓ) for all ℓ = 1, . . . , r, and pos(≻′j , i) > r + 1 for i = alt(≻j, r + 1). Let
≻= (≻j ,≻−j) and ≻′= (≻′j ,≻−j). Since the other agents’ inputs have not changed, MaxMatch(≻) and
MaxMatch(≻′) proceed identically up to the end of stage r. So if j has been assigned an item by this
time (which happens in both runs) we are done. Otherwise, in MaxMatch(≻′), all of j’s top-r items are
unavailable, and since j demotes i in ≻′, edge (j, i) does not belong to the graph Gr+1 constructed in stage
r + 1; so j does not obtain i or a top-r item under input ≻′. This proves pseudomonotonicity. 
Theorem 4.2. For every ǫ > 0, there is a matching market on which every deterministic algorithm has
rank-approximation factor at least 2− ǫ.
Proof. Let K ≥ 1 be an integer such that K2K−1 ≤ 12−ǫ . We create an instance with n = 2K−1 players and
items. We specify the first K preferences of the players; the remaining preferences may be set arbitrarily.
Let ≻ denote the resulting input (with arbitrary remaining preferences). Since this is the only input we
consider, we drop the ≻ in rankr(o;≻) and maxrankr(≻) in the sequel.
– For r = 2, . . . ,K − 1, the r-th preference of a player j is item:


r ; if j = r,
K + r − 1 ; if j = r − 1,
r − 1 ; otherwise.
– The first preference of a player j is: item 1 if j = 1, and item n otherwise.
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– The K-th preference of a player j is: item K if j = K − 1, and item K − 1 otherwise.
First, we claim that maxrankr ≥ 2r for all r ∈ [K − 1]. For r = 1, this is achieved by matching player
1 to item 1, and an arbitrary other player to item n. For r = 2, . . . ,K − 1, this is achieved by matching
player r to item r, each player j ∈ [r − 1] to item K + j, matching one player from {r + 1, . . . , n} to item
n and r− 1 other arbitrary players from {r+1, . . . , n} arbitrarily to items in [r− 1]. Note that each player
is matched to a top-r item in this matching. Also, maxrankK = n. This is achieved by matching player
K − 1 to item K , each player j ∈ [K − 2] to item K + j, matching one player from {K, . . . , n} to item n,
and the remaining K − 1 players from {K, . . . , n} arbitrarily to items in [K − 1].
Now fix a matching o. We show that if rankr(o) > maxrankr /2 for r = 1, . . . ,K − 1, then we must
have rankK(o) ≤ K ≤ maxrankK /(2 − ǫ). Thus, we cannot have rankr(o) > maxrankr /(2 − ǫ) for all
r ∈ [K].
We show by induction on r that if rankℓ(o) > maxrankℓ /2 for all ℓ ∈ [r], where r < K , then o must
match player ℓ to item ℓ for all ℓ ∈ [r]. For the base case, if rank1(o) > maxrank1 /2 ≥ 1, then o must
match player 1 to item 1 since all other players have item n as their top item. For the induction step, suppose
that rankℓ(o) > maxrankℓ /2 for all ℓ ∈ [r], where 1 < r < K . Then, by the induction hypothesis, we
know that o matches player ℓ to item ℓ for all ℓ ∈ [r − 1]. We require that rankr(o) ≥ r + 1. Examining
the preferences of the players in {r, . . . , n}, we see that for player r, items r and n are the only unmatched
items in his top-r list, and for a player j ∈ {r + 1, . . . , n}, item n is the only unmatched item in j’s top-r
list. Therefore, rankr(o) ≥ r + 1 is only possible if o matches player r to item r.
Given the above claim, for players j = K, . . . , n, item n is the only unmatched item in their top-K list,
so rankK(o) ≤ K . 
We now show that randomization is necessary to achieve good rank approximation via truthful mecha-
nisms. As a warm up, we first prove a lower bound of n − 1 on the rank-approximation factor achievable
by truthful no-bossy mechanisms [25]. A no-bossy mechanism for matching markets is one where no agent
can change his preference and modify the outcome without also modifying his own allocation.
Suppose there are n items. Let ≻∗:= (1, 2, . . . , n) denote the ordering where item i is the i-th ranked
item, for all i ∈ [n]. Let ≻∗ ◦(k − 1, 1), denote the preference list that is identical to ≻∗ except that items
(k − 1) and 1 are swapped. That is, (k − 1) is the top-item, 1 is the kth-choice, and item i is the i-th
choice for all i 6= 1, k − 1. Given n agents and any set S ⊆ {2, 3, . . . , n}, let ≻S be the preference profile
where each agent k ∈ S has preference ≻∗ ◦(k − 1, 1), while each k /∈ S has preference ≻∗. Thus, ≻∅
is the preference profile where every agent has the same preference order ≻∗ over items. For notational
convenience, we think of a player who is not assigned an item as being assigned item n+ 1, which is lower
ranked than any (true) item in [n].
Theorem 4.3. No deterministic truthful no-bossy mechanism for matching markets can have rank-approximation
smaller than (n− 1).
Proof. We consider a matching market with n (agents and) items. Let M be any deterministic truthful no-
bossy mechanism. Suppose that M(≻∅) assigns items to N players. By renaming players if necessary, we
may assume that M(≻∅) assigns item i to player i for all i ∈ [N ], and item n+ 1 to the remaining players.
Consider the input ≻{k}. We claim that M(≻{k}) = M(≻∅). Due to no-bossiness, it suffices to show
that agent k’s allocation is the same in M(≻{k}) and M(≻∅). Suppose agent k obtains item i in M(≻{k}).
Invoking truthfulness when k’s true preference list is ≻∗ (and the other players’ preference lists are ≻∗), we
obtain that k ∗ i, that is, k ≤ i. Similarly, if k’s true preference list were ≻∗ ◦(k − 1, 1), then truthfulness
dictates that i ≤ k. Hence, we have i = k.
The above argument can be generalized to show that for any S ⊆ [n], we have M(≻S) =M(≻S\k) =
M(≻∅) for all k ∈ S. In particular, M(≻{2,...,n}) assigns item i to player i for all i ∈ [N ] and leaves the
other players unassigned. So under the preference profile ≻{2,...,n}, at most one agent, agent 1, gets his top
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choice; however, assigning every player j > 1 item j − 1 yields an outcome where n − 1 agents get their
top choice. 
While no-bossiness was crucial above, we show via a more sophisticated argument that no deterministic
truthful mechanism can obtain constant rank approximation.
Theorem 4.4. Every deterministic truthful mechanism has rank approximation Ω( log lognlog log logn).
Proof. Let n be large enough so that K :=
⌊
log logn
log log logn
⌋
− 2 ≥ 1. We show that on instances with n (agents
and) items, no deterministic truthful mechanism can have rank approximation better than K .
As before, if M(≻∅) assigns items to N players, we may assume that it matches agent i to item i for
i ∈ [N ], and the remaining players are unassigned (i.e., assigned item n + 1). Given agents {a1, . . . , ak}
and integers r1, . . . , rk ≥ 1, we let ≻(a1,r1),(a2,r2),...,(ak ,rk) denote the preference profile where all agents
other than these aℓ’s have preference order ≻∗, while each aℓ has preference order ≻∗ ◦(rℓ, 1)). That is, aℓ’s
top choice is item rℓ, his rℓ-th choice is item 1, and his i-th choice is item i for all i 6= 1, rℓ. We show that
there exist agents a1, . . . , aK and distinct integers r1, . . . , rK ∈ [K], such that, in M(≻(a1,r1),...,(aK ,rK)),
every agent a1, . . . , aK gets an item whose index is larger than K . Since all other agents have the same top
item, the number of agents getting their top item is at most 1. This proves that the rank approximation is at
least K , since assigning item rℓ to agent aℓ for all ℓ ∈ [K], yields an outcome where K agents obtain their
top-choice item.
To find these K agents, we proceed in K stages. In stage ℓ, we will have a subset Sℓ of agents with
|Sℓ| ≥ ℓ having the following property. For any t < ℓ, any t agents {a1, . . . , at} ⊆ Sℓ, and for any t distinct
integers r1, . . . , rt ∈ [K], M(≻(a1,r1),...,(at,rt)) allocates all agents in Sℓ an item indexed larger than K .
Note that if we reach stage K , then we are done due to the following reason. Consider any K agents
a1, . . . , aK ∈ SK and any K distinct integers r1, . . . , rK ∈ [K]. Consider any index ℓ ∈ [K]. Let
≻′=≻(a1,r1),...,(aℓ−1,rℓ−1),(aℓ+1,rℓ+1),(aK−1,rK−1) and ≻=≻(a1,r1),...,(aK ,rK). We know that M(≻′) allocates
all agents in SK an item indexed larger than K . This also implies that o := M(≻) allocates aℓ an item
indexed larger than K , otherwise given the preference profile ≻′, player ℓ has an incentive to deviate from
his preference list ≻∗ and report ≻∗ ◦(rℓ, 1). Since this holds for all ℓ, it follows that o allocates every agent
a1, . . . , aK an item indexed larger than K .
We now show how to obtain the Sℓ sets. For ℓ < K , the set Sℓ will satisfy the stronger property that
|Sℓ|
1
ℓ+1 ≥ 2K (the reason for this will become clear later). The base case is S1 = {K + 1, . . . , n}, which
satisfies the stated property. Given a set Sℓ at the end of stage ℓ < K we now show how to construct the set
Sℓ+1 ⊆ Sℓ. We construct the following hypergraph Hℓ. The vertices are the agents in Sℓ. The hyperedges
are subsets of vertices of size at most (ℓ+1) constructed as follows. For every ℓ-size subset {a1, . . . , aℓ} of
Sℓ, and every a ∈ Sℓ (which could be the same as one of the ats), we add the hyperedge {a1, . . . , aℓ, a} if
there exist ℓ distinct integers r1, . . . , rℓ ∈ [K] such that M(≻(a1,r1),...,(aℓ,rℓ)) allocates agent a an item with
index at most K . Note that the number of hyperedges is at most |Sℓ|ℓ ·Kℓ+1 since there are |Sℓ| choices for
each at, and K choices for each rt, and once these are fixed, there at most K choices for a.
Call a subset U ⊆ Sℓ independent if no hyperedge is completely contained in it. Observe that U is a
valid input to stage (ℓ + 1) if |U | ≥ ℓ+ 1: consider any t < ℓ + 1 agents a1, . . . , at ∈ U and any distinct
integers r1, . . . , rt ∈ [K]. Suppose that M(≻(a1,r1),...,(at,rt)) allocates some agent a ∈ U an item with
index at most K . Then we must have t = ℓ, otherwise this would contradict the property assumed of Sℓ,
and then {a1, . . . , at, a} would be a hyperedge, contradicting independence of U .
Lemma 4.5 shows that there is an independent set Sℓ+1 ⊆ Sℓ such that |Sℓ+1| ≥ |Sℓ|
1
ℓ+1
K
− 1 ≥ |Sℓ|
1
ℓ+1
2K ,
where the last inequality follows since |Sℓ|
1
ℓ+1 ≥ 2K . Since |St|
1
t+1 ≥ 2K for all t ≤ ℓ, we have
|Sℓ+1| ≥ |Sℓ|
1
ℓ+1/2K ≥ |S1|
1
(ℓ+1)! /(2K)ℓ ≥
(n
2
) 1
(ℓ+1)!
/(2K)ℓ ≥
(n
2
) 1
K!
/(2K)K−1.
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Moreover, if ℓ+1 < K, then |Sℓ+1|
1
ℓ+2 ≥ (n2 )
1
(ℓ+2)!/(2K)ℓ ≥ (n2 )
1
K! /(2K)K−2. For K ≤ log lognlog log logn − 2,
we have
(
n
2
) 1
K! /(2K)K−1 ≥ 2K . Hence, |Sℓ+1| ≥ 2K , and if ℓ+1 < K, we have |Sℓ+1|
1
ℓ+2 ≥ 2K . Thus,
we obtain that |SK | ≥ 2K . 
Lemma 4.5. There exists an independent set Sℓ+1 ⊆ Sℓ of size |Sℓ+1| ≥ |Sℓ|
1
ℓ+1
K
− 1.
Proof. Let N = |Sℓ|. Recall the number of hyperedges is at most N ℓKℓ+1. We first argue that all hyper-
edges are of size ℓ+1. Every hyperedge is of size at least ℓ. A size-ℓ hyperedge {a1, . . . , aℓ} can only arise,
if there are ℓ distinct integers r1, . . . , rℓ ∈ [K] and some a ∈ {a1, . . . , aℓ}, say a1 for notational convenience
such that M(≻(a1,r1),...,(aℓ,rℓ)) allots a an item indexed less than K . But the definition of Sℓ implies that
M(≻(a2,r2),...,(aℓ,rℓ)) allots a1 an item with index larger than K . This violates truthfulness, since agent a1
has an incentive to misreport ≻∗ ◦(r1, 1) when his true preference is ≻∗ and obtain a better item.
Consider sampling each vertex of Hℓ with probability p = K−1 · N−(
ℓ
ℓ+1) to get a random subset X. If
X contains a hyperedge, then we remove all its vertices from X. The probability that a hyperedge is present
in X is at most pℓ+1, since all hyperedges are of size ℓ + 1. Therefore, in expectation, the size of X after
removal is at least pN − pℓ+1N ℓKℓ+1 = N 1/ℓ+1
K
− 1. 
4.1 A generalization: matroid markets
In this generalization of matching markets, there is a matroid Mi = (N,Ii) on the agent-set N for each
item i, and multiple agents may be assigned to item i provided they form an independent set of Mi. Here
Ii is a collection of subsets of N with the following properties: (i) ∅ ∈ Ii; for all A,B ⊆ N (ii) if A ∈ Ii
and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ Ii; (iii) if A,B ∈ Ii and |A| > |B|, then there exists some j ∈ A \ B such
that B ∪ {j} ∈ Ii. Clearly, the lower bounds obtained for matching markets also hold in this setting.
Complementing this, we extend MaxMatch to obtain a pseudomonotone 2-rank-approximation algorithm
for matroid markets. Let L be the set of all items.
Theorem 4.6. There is a pseudomonotone 2-rank approximation algorithm for matroid markets, and a
mechanism that fully LT-implements it.
Proof. The algorithm is similar to MaxMatch. Again fix an agent-ordering and an item-ordering. Consider
some input ≻.
We again proceed in m stages. In stage r, we consider the “top-r” graph Gr = (N ∪L,Er), where each
agent j has edges to his top-r items. Note that every outcome induces a feasible solution to the matroid-
intersection problem defined by the following two matroids on the universe Er. One is MA, which is the
direct sum of the Mi matroids for all i ∈ L, i.e., a set I ⊆ Er is independent if {j : (j, i) ∈ I} ∈ Ii for all
i ∈ L. The second is the partition matroid MB(r) encoding that at most one edge of Er is incident to each
agent j. Then every outcome induces a set that is independent in both MA and MB(r), and maxrankr(≻)
is the size of the largest common independent set.
LetM consist of the edges denoting the current (i.e., at the start of stage r) assignment of items to agents.
Our algorithm will maintain the invariant that at the end of stage r, M is a maximal set that is independent in
both MA and MB(r). The rank-approximation factor of 2 follows then from the well-known fact that every
maximal common independent set of two matroids has size at least half the size of maximum-cardinality
common independent set; Claim 4.7 gives a self-contained proof.
Let Γr(u) denote the neighbors of node u in Gr, and ΓrM (u) := {v : (u, v) ∈ M}. Note that if M is a
maximal common independent set in Gr−1, then for every agent j that is not assigned an item in M , among
j’s top-r items his r-th ranked item is the only item to which j can be possible assigned while preserving
independence in the item’s matroid.
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We consider each item i and augment ΓrM(i), the current set of agents assigned to item i, to a maximal
subset Ji ⊆ Γr(i) that is independent in Mi: we initialize Ji to ΓrM (i). Next, we consider agents in
Γr(i) \ ΓrM (i) according to the fixed agent-ordering and add agent j to Ji if this maintains independence in
Mi. Maximality of Ji follows from the matroid property. (In fact Ji is a maximum-size independent subset
of Γr(i).) Finally, we update M to reflect the new assignments in stage r.
The fact that M is a maximal common independent set of MA and MB(r) is immediate: if some edge
(j, i) can be added to M while preserving independence in MA and MB(r), then j was unassigned at the
start of stage r and when we considered item i, j could (and would) have been added to Ji in the iteration
when j was considered.
We have already argued that the above algorithm is a 2-rank-approximation. Pseudomonotonicity of the
above algorithm follows from exactly the same arguments as in Theorem 4.1. 
Claim 4.7. Let M1(U,I1), M2 = (U,I2) be two matroids. Let S ⊆ U be an inclusion-wise maximal set
that is independent in both M1 and M2. Let A be a maximum-cardinality set that is independent in both M1
and M2. Then |S| ≥ |A|/2
Proof. Suppose |S| < |A|/2. Let T1 = {e ∈ A : S ∪ {e} ∈ I1}. Since A ∈ I1, by the matroid exchange
property, we have |T1| ≥ |A| − |S| > |A|/2. Similarly, if T2 = {e ∈ A : S ∪ {e} ∈ I2}, then we have
|T2| > |A|/2. But since T1, T2 ⊆ A, this means that T1∩T2 6= ∅, and so if e ∈ T1∩T2, then e can be added
to S while maintaining independence in both M1 and M2. This contradicts the maximality of S. 
5 Scheduling markets
Recall that here the agents are n jobs that need to be assigned on m machines. Each job j has a private strict
total ordering over the machines, and a publicly-known processing time pij on machine i. An outcome is a
partial assignment of jobs to machines, also called a schedule, that has makespan at most a given value T .
An agent prefers outcome o to outcome o′ if he prefers his assigned machine in o to that in o′.
We obtain nearly tight results for scheduling markets. Say that an algorithm is an (α, β)-approximation
if it always returns a schedule with rank-approximation factor α and makespan at most βT . For parallel
machines (pij = pj for all i, j), we give an
(
O(log n), O(1)
)
-approximation, fully lex-truthfully (LT) im-
plementable algorithm (Theorem 5.2). We show that this bound is tight by proving an algorithmic lower
bound showing that every (α, β)-approximation algorithm for parallel machines must have
α = Ω(max{logm, log n}/β) (Theorem 5.3). For the setting of general unrelated machines, we devise an(
O(log n), O(1)
)
-approximation algorithm (Theorem 5.4), however we do not know how to achieve this via
a fully LT-implementable algorithm. We leave this as an intriguing open question.
Let N denote the set of jobs. For S ⊆ N , let ≻S denote the restriction of ≻ to jobs in S, and
maxrankr(≻S) denote the maximum number of jobs from S that can be assigned to one of their top-r
machines with makespan at most T . Observe that maxrankr(≻S∪T ) ≤ maxrankr(≻S)+maxrankr(≻T ).
Parallel machines Our results rely on a bucketing argument coupled with Theorem 4.6 for matroid-
markets and some insights from the matroid-intersection problem. We divide the set N of jobs into k =
O(log n) disjoint classes N0, N1, . . . , Nk such that jobs in each class have roughly the same processing
time. Set N0 := {j : pj ≤ Tn }, and Nℓ := {j : 2ℓ−1 · Tn < pj ≤ 2ℓ · Tn } for ℓ = 1, . . . , k := ⌈log2 n⌉.
Note that if j /∈ ⋃kℓ=0Nℓ, then pj > T , so j cannot be assigned to any machine in any outcome and is not
counted in maxrankr(≻) for any position r. We assume for notational convenience that N does not contain
any such job in the sequel. It will be convenient to ensure that |N0| ≥ 1. So we remove some fixed job a
from the Nℓ set containing it and add it to N0.
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Obtaining a good rank-approximation for a class Nℓ, where ℓ ≥ 1, with makespan O(T ) amounts to a
matroid-market problem (in fact, a b-matching problem) since the makespan bound can be encoded by the
constraint that at most n
2ℓ−1
jobs are assigned to each machine. Any feasible schedule for Nℓ yields a feasible
allocation for the corresponding matroid-market problem. So Theorem 4.6 yields a pseudomonotone (2, 2)-
approximation algorithm fℓ for class Nℓ, and a mechanism Mεℓ that ε-implements it, for all ε > 0.
Theorem 5.1. One can obtain a deterministic fully LT-implementable (O(1), O(log n))-approximation al-
gorithm for parallel-machine markets.
Proof. On input ≻, we output the schedule obtained by concatenating the schedule where all jobs in N0 are
assigned to their top machine, and all the fℓ(≻Nℓ) schedules. Note that the N0-schedule has makespan at
most 2T . The resulting schedule, denoted f(≻), has makespan O(T log n) and rank-approximation factor
2 (since maxrankr(≻N ) ≤
∑k
ℓ=0maxrankr(≻Nℓ)). Fix ε > 0. The jobs in N0 clearly have no incentive
to lie. It is easy to see then that f is ε-LT implemented by the mechanism that outputs the N0-schedule
concatenated with the (random) schedules output by the Mεℓ mechanisms, where we couple the random
choices of all the Mεℓ mechanisms (i.e., their decisions are based on the outcomes of the same random
coins) so that Pr[∃ ℓ :Mεℓ(≻Nℓ) 6= fℓ(≻Nℓ)] ≤ ε. 
Theorem 5.2. There is a randomized fully LT-implementable (O(log n), O(1))-approximation algorithm
for parallel-machine markets, where the rank-approximation and makespan bounds hold with probability 1.
Proof. Consider an input ≻. As before, we assign all jobs in N0 to their top machine. Note that simply
picking a class Nℓ with probability 1k and outputting the concatenation of the N0-schedule and fℓ(≻Nℓ) is
not enough since this only yields O(k) rank approximation in expectation. Instead, we build upon the above
ideas and leverage some results about the matroid-intersection problem.
Consider the following bipartite graph representing the concatenation σ of all the fℓ(≻Nℓ) schedules.
We have a node for every machine, and every job not in N0, and an edge (i, j) if j is assigned to machine
i in schedule σ. Now set xij = 1k for every edge (i, j). Define Ai,ℓ :=
⌈
n
2ℓ−1k
⌉
for all i, ℓ and Br :=⌊
rankr(σ;≻N\N0)/k
⌋
for all r. Consider the following polytope:
P :=
{
y ∈ R[m]×(N\N0) :
∑
j∈Nℓ
yij ≤ Ai,ℓ ∀i ∈ [m], ℓ ∈ [k],
∑
j:pos(≻j ,σ(j))≤r
yij ≥ Br ∀r ∈ [m], 0 ≤ yij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [m], j /∈ N0
}
.
(1)
We claim that P has integral extreme points. Any extreme point of P is defined by a linearly independent
system of tight constraints comprising some
∑
j∈Nℓ
yij = Ai,ℓ equalities whose supports are disjoint, and
some
∑
j:pos(≻j ,σ(j))≤r
yij = Br, yij = 1 equalities whose supports form a laminar family. The constraint
matrix of such a system thus corresponds to equations coming from two laminar set systems; such a matrix
is known to be totally unimodular (TU) (see, e.g., [26]), and hence a solution to this system is integral.
Note that x ∈ P, so it can be expressed as a convex combination of some extreme points of P. Equiva-
lently, x yields a distribution over partial schedules for N \N0. Let Y be a random schedule, or equivalently
vector in R[m]×(N\N0), sampled from this distribution. Note that Pr[j is assigned in Y ] = xij = 1k for
j /∈ N0. The makespan of Y is at most 6T with probability 1. This is because
∑
j pjYij ≤
∑k
ℓ=1
(
1 +
n
2ℓ−1k
) · 2ℓ · T
n
≤ 2k+1 · T
n
+ 2T ≤ 6T . Let Π be the (random) schedule obtained by concatenating the
N0-schedule with Y . Then Π has makespan at most 8T with probability 1. Also, rankr(Π;≻) ≥ |N0|+Br
with probability 1. Now Br ≥
⌊
maxrankr(≻N\N0)/2k
⌋
. Finally,
maxrankr(≻) ≤ |N0|+maxrankr(≻N\N0)
≤ |N0|+max{2k, 4k
⌊
maxrankr(≻N\N0 /2k)
⌋}
≤ 4k(|N0|+Br),
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where the latter inequality follows since |N0| ≥ 1. Thus, the randomized algorithm f that outputs the
random schedule Π is an
(
O(log n), O(1)
)
-approximation with probability 1.
We now proceed as in the proof of Theorems 3.6 and 3.7 to devise a mechanism M that fully LT-
implements f . Fix ε > 0, and ε1 > . . . > εm such that
∑m
r=1 εr = ε. Consider input ≻. Let Y ≻ be the
random schedule for N \N0 for input ≻N\N0 as obtained above. Mechanism M always assigns jobs in N0
to their top machines. For jobs in N \N0, it returns schedule Y ≻ with probability 1 − ε. For each j /∈ N0
and r ∈ [m], with probability εr
n
, it returns the schedule where j is assigned to its r-th ranked machine
alt(≻j , r), and all other jobs are unassigned. Clearly, M(≻) = f(≻) with probability at least 1− ε.
Jobs in N0 do not benefit by lying. Consider a job j ∈ Nℓ, where ℓ ≥ 1. Let ≻′= (≻j ,≻−j), where
≻′j 6=≻j . Let xij = xij(≻) and x′ij = xij(≻′) denote the probabilities that j is assigned to i under the
random schedules Y = Y ≻ and Y ′ = Y ≻′ respectively. Then,
∆ij := Pr[j assigned to i in M(≻)]−Pr[j assigned to i in M(≻′)]
= (1− ε)(xij − x′ij) +
1
n
· (εpos(≻j ,i) − εpos(≻′j ,i)
)
.
Considering machines in the preference order of ≻j , let iˆ be the first machine such that pos(≻j , iˆ) 6=
pos(≻′j , iˆ). Then pos(≻j, iˆ) < pos(≻′j , iˆ). If x′ij = 0 for all i j iˆ, then ∆ij ≥ 0 for all i j iˆ, and
∆iˆj > 0, so we are done. Otherwise, j is assigned to some machine i
′ j iˆ in fℓ(≻′Nℓ). Since all machines
i ≻j i′ have pos(≻j, i) = pos(≻′j, i) and fℓ is pseudomonotone, it must be that j is assigned to i′′ j i′ in
fℓ(≻Nℓ). So xij = x′ij , and hence, ∆ij = 0, for all i ≻j i′′. If i′′ 6= i′, then ∆i′′j > 0, otherwise ∆ij = 0
for all i ≻j iˆ and ∆iˆj > 0. Thus, M is lex-truthful. 
Theorem 5.3. There exists an instance of a parallel-machine market where any schedule with βT makespan
has rank-approximation factor Ω(max{logm, log n}/β).
Proof. We create an instance with n = O(m lnm) jobs as follows. We create a set A(1) of m jobs of size
(i.e., pj) T partitioned into A(1)1 , . . . , A(1)m , where each A(1)i consists of a single job whose first preference
is machine i. We create a set A(2) of 2(m − 1) jobs of size T2 partitioned into A(2)2 , . . . , A(2)m , all of which
have machine 1 as their first preference. Each set A(2)i has two jobs, both having machine i as their 2nd
preference. In general for i < k, we have a set A(i) of 2i−1(m − i + 1) jobs of size T
2i−1
partitioned into
A
(i)
i , . . . , A
(i)
m , all of which have machine r as their r-th preference for r = 1, . . . , i − 1. Each set A(i)ℓ has
2i−1 jobs, all of which have machine ℓ as their i-th preference. Finally, we have a set A(k) of 2km jobs of
size T
2k
partitioned into A(k)k , . . . , A
(k)
m , all having machine r as their r-th preference for r = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Each set A(k)ℓ has at least 2k jobs, all of which have machine ℓ as their k-th preference. The remaining
preferences of the jobs play no role, and may be set arbitrarily. Let ≻ be the resulting preference profile.
For r ∈ [k], we have maxrankr(≻) ≥ 2r−1(m − r + 1) + 2k(r − 1) ≥ 2r−1m obtained by assigning
all jobs in A(r)ℓ to machine ℓ for ℓ = r, . . . ,m, and any 2k(r − 1) jobs from A(k) to machines 1, . . . , r − 1.
Suppose we have a schedule σ with makespan βT that achieves α rank approximation. Then, rankr(σ;≻) ≥
2r−1m
α
for all r = 1, . . . , k. Let sr be the number of jobs assigned to their r-th ranked machine in σ, and tr be
the number of jobs of size at least T
2r−1
assigned to their r-th ranked machine in σ. Observe that tr ≥ sr−β2k
since the jobs counted in sr but not in tr lie in
⋃k
ℓ=r+1A
(ℓ)
, all of which have machine r as their r-th ranked
machine; at most β2k such jobs can be accommodated within makespan βT . Now βmT is at least the total
size of all jobs scheduled by σ, which is at least ∑kr=1(sr − β2k) · T2r−1 ≥∑kr=1 sr · T2r−1 − β2k+1T . So
β(mT+2k+1T ) ≥ 1
2
k∑
r=1
sr
k∑
ℓ=r
T
2ℓ−1
=
1
2
k∑
ℓ=1
T
2ℓ−1
ℓ∑
r=1
sr =
1
2
k∑
ℓ=1
T
2ℓ−1
·rankℓ(σ;≻) ≥ 1
2
k∑
ℓ=1
T
2ℓ−1
·2
ℓ−1m
α
.
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Taking k = log2m, this gives 3βmT ≥ kmT2α , so α ≥ k6β = Ω(logm/β). Also, the number of jobs is at
most k · 2k = O(m logm), so α is also Ω(log n/β). 
Unrelated machines We obtain an
(
O(log n), O(1)
)
approximation for the general setting of unrelated
machines.
Theorem 5.4. There is a deterministic
(
O(log n), O(1)
)
approximation algorithm for scheduling markets.
Proof. We will need Lemma 5.5 stated below. Fix an input≻. We use a different kind of bucketing argument
where we group ranks that have roughly the same value of maxrankr(≻). For r ∈ [m], let σr be the schedule
given by Lemma 5.5 that yields a 2-approximation to maxrankr(≻), Nr be the set of jobs assigned by σr,
and nr = |Nr|. We may assume that n1 ≤ n2 ≤ . . . nm. Define n0 = 0. If nm = 0, then maxrankr(≻) = 0
for all r ∈ [m], and we return the null assignment. So assume otherwise in the sequel.
Define r0 := 0 < r1 < r2 < . . . < rk < rk+1 = m + 1 as follows: rℓ is the smallest r such
that nr > 4nrℓ−1 for ℓ = 1, . . . , k, and nm ≤ 4nrk . Thus, k ≤ ⌈log4 n⌉ and nrℓ ≤ nr ≤ 4nrℓ for all
r ∈ [rℓ, rℓ+1) and all ℓ = 0, . . . , k. For ℓ ∈ [k], define Srℓ := Nrℓ \ (
⋃ℓ−1
q=1Nrq); note that |Srℓ | ≥
2nrℓ
3 .
If nrk < 2k for all r, we simply return the assignment σr1 . Clearly, this yields a 2k rank approximation.
Otherwise, let q be the smallest index ℓ such that nrℓ ≥ 2k. Let S =
⋃k
ℓ=q Srℓ . Let σ be the schedule
for S, where each job j ∈ Srℓ is assigned to the machine σrℓ(j), for ℓ = q, . . . , k. Let Li := |{j :
σ(j) = i}|. Consider the following bipartite graph, which is similar to the bipartite graph constructed in
the GAP-rounding algorithm [28]. We have a node for every job in S, and a node (i, c) for every machine
i and c = 1, . . . ,
⌈
Li
k−q+1
⌉
. We sort the jobs assigned to i in σ in non-increasing pij order (breaking ties
arbitrarily), and create an edge ((i, c), j) if σ(j) = i and its position in this ordering lies in {(c−1)(k− q+
1) + 1, . . . , c(k − q + 1)}. Let E be the edge-set of this bipartite graph. Consider the following polytope:
Q :=
{
y ∈ RE :
∑
j:((i,c),j)∈E
y(i,c),j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [m], c = 1, . . . ,
⌈
Li
k−q+1
⌉
,
∑
((i,c),j)∈E:j∈Srℓ
y(i,c),j ≥
⌊ |Srℓ |
k − q + 1
⌋
∀ℓ = q, . . . , k, 0 ≤ y(i,c),j ≤ 1 ∀
(
(i, c), j
) ∈ E}. (2)
As with the polytope P (see (1)), the constraint-matrix defining an extreme point of Q corresponds to
equations coming from two laminar systems, which is TU, so Q has integral extreme points. Setting
x(i,c),j =
1
k−q+1 for every edge
(
(i, c), j
)
, note that x ∈ Q. So we can find an integral y ∈ Q, which
we interchangeably view as a partial assignment of S. We return the schedule π obtained by concatenating
σr1 with this assignment y.
The schedule σr1 has makespan at most T . By the standard GAP-rounding proof in [28], the makespan
of y is at most
T + 1
k−q+1 ·
∑
j:σ(j)=i
pij = T +
1
k−q+1 ·
k∑
ℓ=q
∑
j∈Srℓ :σ
rℓ(j)=i
pij ≤ 2T.
So π has makespan at most 3T . Fix some rank r. If r < r1, then maxrankr(≻) = 0. If r1 ≤ r < rq,
we have rankr(π;≻) ≥ nr1 ≥ 1 > nr/2k ≥ maxrankr(≻)/4k. Otherwise, suppose r ∈ [rℓ, rℓ+1),
where ℓ ≥ q. Then rankr(π;≻) ≥
⌊
|Srℓ |
k
⌋
≥
⌊
2nrℓ
3k
⌋
≥ nrℓ3k , where the last inequality follows since
nrℓ ≥ nrq ≥ 2k, and
nrℓ
3k ≥ nr12k ≥ maxrankr(≻)24k . So π has O(k) rank approximation. 
Lemma 5.5. For any preference-profile ≻, any set S ⊆ N , and any rank r, one can efficiently compute a
2-approximation to maxrankr(≻S).
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Proof. Shmoys and Tardos [28] proved the following result about GAP. Let {cij} be “assignment costs” for
assigning jobs to machines, which could also be negative. Consider the following LP, where i indexes the
machines and j indexes the jobs.
min
∑
i,j
cijxij (P)
s.t.
∑
i
xij = 1 ∀j (3)
∑
j
tijxij ≤ Li ∀i
xij ≥ 0 ∀i, j
xij = 0 ∀i, j s.t. tij > Li.
[28] showed that a fractional solution x to (P) can be rounded to an integer solution x˜ of cost at most the cost
of x such that the total load
∑
j tij x˜ij on each machine i is at most 2Li. Examining their rounding algorithm
more closely, one can infer that the total load on each machine i under x˜ is at most Li if
∑
j xij ≤ 1, and at
most Li +maxj:xij>0 tij otherwise.
We apply this result to our problem of approximating maxrankr(≻S) as follows. The set of jobs is S.
Our problem is a prize-collecting problem, which we can reduce to GAP by creating a “machine” Ij for
every job j ∈ S and setting tIjk = 0 if k = j and ∞ otherwise. There is no makespan bound for these Ij
machines. For every (regular) machine i and job j, we set tij = pij if pos(≻j, i) ≤ r and ∞ otherwise; the
makespan bound for i is T . Finally, our objective is to maximize the number of jobs assigned to the regular
machines (with tij <∞). In terms of the LP (P), constraint (3) now reads
∑
i xij + zj = 1 for every j ∈ S,
where zj indicates if j is assigned to Ij , and the objective function is to maximize
∑
i
∑
j∈S xij .
Applying the GAP-rounding algorithm, we obtain an assignment x˜ with makespan at most 2T such that
rankr(x˜;≻S) = maxrankr(≻S). To turn this into a feasible schedule with makespan T , we leverage the
stronger property of the rounding algorithm mentioned above. If the load on machine i under x˜ is more than
T , then we know that i has at least two jobs assigned to it, and there is a job assigned to i whose removal
decreases the load on i to at most T . We simply remove this job from every overloaded machine i. This
reduces the number of jobs assigned to an overloaded machine i by a factor of at most 2 (since ∑j x˜ij ≥ 2),
so now we obtain a schedule with makespan T where the number of jobs assigned (to one of their top-r
machines) is at least maxrankr(≻S)/2. 
6 Mechanisms for general ordinal settings
In this section, we evaluate the strength and flexibility provided by the notions of rank approximation and
lex-truthfulness in general ordinal settings. We devise an O(log n)-rank-approximation randomized mech-
anism, and show that this guarantee is tight for randomized mechanisms (Theorems 6.2 and 6.3). We also
observe that deterministic mechanisms cannot in general achieve good rank approximation. Next, we con-
sider lex-truthfulness and justify our earlier remark that lex-truthfulness allows one to circumvent Gibbard’s
impossibility result. We describe a rich class of pseudomonotone SCFs called top-choice SCFs, which thus
lead to (non-unilateral, non-duple) LT mechanisms.
Rank approximation It is easy to see that any deterministic dictatorial SCF has rank approximation (at
most) n. Also, the plurality scoring rule fPl, which returns the outcome that maximizes the number of
agents who have it as their top choice, has rank1
(
fPl(≻);≻) ≥ n
m
, so its rank-approximation factor is at
most m. It is not hard to prove a matching lower bound for deterministic mechanisms.
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Theorem 6.1. No deterministic mechanism can have rank approximation better factor than min{n,m− 1}
in general ordinal settings.
Proof. Consider a preference profile with n agents and n+ 1 outcomes, where the top choices of all agents
are the distinct outcomes {1, . . . , n}, while the second choice of all agents is n+ 1. 
Randomization leads to an exponential improvement (but no more), but we do not know how to achieve
this in a lex-truthful manner.
Theorem 6.2. There is a randomized O(log n)-rank approximation mechanism for general ordinal settings.
Proof. We first describe the mechanism, and then analyze its rank approximation. Fix a preference profile
≻. For brevity, let nr = maxrankr(≻). Let o∗r be an outcome with rankr(o∗r ;≻) = nr. We use a bucketing
argument where we group ranks that have roughly the same nr value. Define r1 := 1 < r2 < . . . < rk <
rk+1 := m + 1 be such that nrℓ ≤ nr ≤ 2nrℓ ∀r ∈ [rℓ, rℓ+1) ∩ Z, for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k Observe that
k ≤ ⌈log2 n⌉. The mechanism chooses an index ℓ ∈ [k] uniformly at random, and outputs o∗rℓ .
To argue about the rank approximation, consider any rank r. Suppose r ∈ [rℓ, rℓ+1). If we choose index
ℓ, which happens with probability 1/k, then at least rankr(o∗rℓ ;≻) ≥ rankrℓ(o∗rℓ ;≻) = nrℓ ≥ nr2 agents are
allotted a top-r item. So E[rankr(M(≻);≻)] ≥ nr2k . 
Theorem 6.3. Every randomized mechanism has rank-approximation factor Ω(log n).
Proof. Fix a parameter k. We construct an instance with n = 2k+1−2 agents andm = (k−1)·(2k+1−2)+k
outcomes. The agents are divided into k groups A1, . . . , Ak, where |Aℓ| = 2ℓ. There are k special outcomes
{o1, . . . , ok}. The remaining m− k outcomes are partitioned into n groups O1, . . . , On, each having k − 1
outcomes. We now describe the preference lists. For every agent j in group Aℓ, outcome oℓ is their ℓ-th
ranked outcome, and the outcomes in Oj occupy the other positions in [k] \ {ℓ}; the exact positions of these
outcomes are irrelevant. The outcomes in positions r ≥ k+1 are also immaterial. Thus, the top-k outcome
sets of agents j and j′ are: disjoint if they are from different groups, and have exactly one outcome, oℓ, in
common, at the ℓ-th position, if they both belong to group Aℓ. Let ≻ denote this input.
Observe that maxrankr(≻) = 2r for all r ∈ [k], and the outcome achieving this is or. Furthermore,
rankr(o) is 2ℓ if o = oℓ for ℓ ∈ [r], and is at most 1 otherwise.
Now consider a randomized mechanism that attains rank approximation α. Let pℓ be the probability
with which it returns the outcome oℓ. Let q be the probability with which it returns an outcome in
⋃n
j=1Oj .
Then, by the definition of rank approximation we have q +
∑
ℓ>r pr +
∑
ℓ≤r pℓ · 2ℓ ≥ α · 2r for all r ∈ [k].
Dividing this inequality by 2r and summing over all r = 1, . . . , k, we obtain that kα ≤ q ·∑kr=1 ( 12r ) +∑k
ℓ=1 pℓ ·
(∑
r<ℓ
1
2r +
∑
r≥ℓ
2ℓ
2r
)
≤ q · 1 +∑kℓ=1 pℓ · 3 ≤ 3. Hence, α ≤ 3k . 
Lex-truthful mechanisms Consider any SCF of the form f(≻) = g({alt(≻j, 1)}nj=1), where g : On 7→ O
has the following property: for all
o−j = (o1, . . . , oj−1, oj+1, . . . , on) ∈ On−1 and all o ∈ O, if g(o, o−j) = o′ then g(o′, o−j) = o′. We
call such an SCF a top-choice SCF since it only looks at the top choices of the players. It is not hard to
see that the plurality scoring rule fPl mentioned earlier (with a fixed tie-breaking rule for outcomes) is an
example of such an SCF. We show that any top-choice SCF is pseudomonotone, and so by Theorem 3.6 is
fully LT-implementable.
Theorem 6.4. Every top-choice SCF is pseudomonotone, and hence is fully LT-implementable.
Proof. Let f be a top-choice SCF defined by g : On 7→ O having the required property. Consider an agent
j, and ≻= (≻j,≻−j), ≻′= (≻′j,≻−j). Let o = alt(≻j , 1). If f(≻) = o or f(≻) =f(≻′), then we are
done. Otherwise, since f(≻) 6= o, we also have f(≻′) 6= o due to the property of g, and also pos(≻′j , o) > 1
(otherwise f(≻) = f(≻′)), and so the pseudomonotonicity condition (Definition 3.5) is satisfied. 
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A Proofs omitted from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Clearly UnivT ⊆ StrongT. If p stochastically dominates q, then p lex-dominates q,
so StrongT ⊆ LexT. If p lex-dominates q, then q cannot stochastically dominate p, so LexT ⊆ WeakT.
We now prove that the various inclusions are strict.
UnivT ( StrongT. Fix a player j. Consider the unilateral mechanism M that returns one of the top
2 outcomes of j, each with probability 12 . M is clearly strongly truthful. But it is not universally truthful.
Consider some input ≻= (≻j,≻−j). If M is a mixture of deterministic truthful mechanisms, then this
mixture must assign a probability mass exactly 12 to deterministic truthful mechanismsM1 satisfyingM1(≻
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) = o = alt(≻j , 1); call these type-1 mechanisms. Similarly, it must assign probability mass exactly 12 to
deterministic truthful mechanisms M2 satisfying M2(≻) = o′ = alt(≻j , 2); call these type-2 mechanisms.
For any preference list ≻∗j , a type-2 mechanism cannot return o under the input (≻∗j ,≻−j) due to truth-
fulness, otherwise on input ≻, j has an incentive to lie in the type-2 mechanism and report ≻∗j . Hence, for
any preference list ≻∗j , where o is one of the top two outcomes, every type-1 mechanism must return o on
input (≻∗j ,≻−j). A symmetric argument shows that for any preference list ≻∗j where o′ is one of the top
two outcomes, every type-2 mechanism must return o′ on input (≻∗j ,≻−j).
Now consider some ≻′j , where the top two outcomes are o′′, oˆ /∈ {o, o′}. Applying the arguments above
we obtain that there are type-3 and type-4 deterministic truthful mechanisms, both of which are assigned
probability mass 12 (in the mixture yielding M): the type-3 mechanisms which always return o′′ whenever
j’s preference list has o′′ as one of the top two outcomes, and the type-4 mechanisms always return oˆ
whenever j’s preference list has oˆ as one of the top two outcomes.
Now some mechanism M′ in the mixture yielding M, must be of multiple types, say type-1 and type-3
for illustration. Then, if ≻′′j has o and o′′ as the top two outcomes of j, M′ must return both o and o′′ on
input (≻′′j ,≻−j), which cannot happen.
StrongT ( LexT. Consider a setting with one player and three outcomes: a, b, c. Consider the top-
choice SCF f defined by the following function: g(a) = a, g(b) = g(c) = c, which satisfies the property
required for f to be a top-choice SCF. By Theorem 6.4, f is pseudomonotone. LetM be the LT mechanism
that 13 -implements f . Let≻= (b, a, c) denoting that b is top-outcome, and≻′= (a, b, c). Let p =M(≻) and
q =M(≻′). Then p(b)+p(a) ≤ 13 since f(≻) = g(b) = c, but q(b)+q(a) ≥ 23 since f(≻′) = g(a) = a.
Thus, M is not strongly truthful.
LexT ( WeakT. Consider a setting with one player and four outcomes: a, b, c, d. Let ≻∗= (a, b, c, d),
denoting that a is the top outcome. Define the following randomized mechanism M: M(≻∗) returns a with
probability 12 and b, c, d with probability
1
6 ; on every other input ≻,M returns one of the top three outcomes
of ≻ with probability 13 . M is weakly truthful, because if ≻6=≻∗ then M assigns total probability 1 to the
top three outcomes of ≻. If ≻=≻∗, then M assigns probability 12 to the top outcome a under ≻∗, whereas
for every other input M assigns probability at most 13 to a.
But M is not lex-truthful: if ≻= (a, b, d, c), then by reporting (a, b, c, d), the player can increase the
probability of his top-outcome a from 13 to
1
2 . 
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We mimic the proof of Theorem 3.6. For all j, and all r ∈ [mj], fix some outcome
ojr ∈ Ojr form the indifference class Ojr of agent j.
We prove part (i) first. Our randomized mechanism M does the following. On input , it returns
f() with probability (1 − ε); with probability ε, it picks a random agent a and returns outcome oar with
probability εar/ε, where εa1 > · · · > εama > 0 are such that
∑ma
r=1 ε
a
r = ε.
Clearly, M ε-implements f . To prove lex-truthfulness, fix an agent j and consider any ′= (′j,−j),
where′j 6=j . Let o = f() and let o′ = f(′). LetOjt1 andOjt2 be the indifference classes of j containing
outcomes o and o′ respectively. Also, let p =M(), q =M(′).
Considering indifference classes in the preference order of j , let Ojr be the first indifference class
such that pos(j, ojr) < pos(′j, ojr). Let o′′ = ojr. By pseudomonotonicity of f , we know that o j o′ or
o′′ ≻j o′. In the latter case, we have p(Ojt )−q(Ojt ) ≥ 0 for all t such that ojt j o′′, and p(Ojr)−q(Ojr) > 0,
so we are done.
If o j o′, and Ojt1 = Ojt2 or o′′ j o, then the above argument still holds. So suppose o ≻j o′ and
o ≻j o′′. Then p(Ojt ) − q(Ojt ) ≥ 0 for all t such that ojt j o and p(Ojt1) − q(Ojt1) > 0, so again we are
done.
Now consider part (ii). Let M be an LT mechanism that ε-LT implements f , where ε < 12 . Suppose
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for a contradiction, there is some agent j, and = (j,−j) and ′= (≻′j ,−j) such that o = f(≻) and
o′ = f(≻′) violate the conditions for pseudomonotonicity. Then we have o′ ≻j o and for every outcome
o′′ ≻j o′, we have pos(≻j , o′′) = pos(≻′j , o′′). Let Ojt1 and Ojt2 be the indifference classes of j containing
outcomes o and o′ respectively. Let p =M() and q =M(′).
Since M ε-LT implements f , we have p(Ojt2) ≤ ε and q(Ojt2) ≥ q(o′) ≥ 1 − ε, so p(Ojt2) < q(Ojt2).
Let Ojr1 , . . . , O
j
rℓ be the indifference classes of j that are ranked higher than O
j
t2
under j , ordered so that
ojr1 ≻j ojr2 ≻j · · · ≻j ojrℓ . Since pos(≻j, o′′) = pos(≻′j , o′′) for all o′′ ≻j o′, Ojr1 , . . . , Ojrℓ are also the
indifference class of j that are ranked higher than Ojt2 under ′j , and we have ojr1 ≻′j ojr2 ≻′j · · · ≻′j ojrℓ . As
in the proof of Theorem 3.6, this implies that p(Ojrt) = q(O
j
rt) for all t = 1, . . . , ℓ, which contradicts the
fact that M is lex-truthful. 
B Quality of known mechanisms for matching markets
In this section, we investigate the rank approximation and lex-truthfulness of three extensively studied mech-
anisms for matching markets. These are random serial dictatorship mechanism (RSD), Gale’s top-trading-
cycle algorithm (TTCA), and the probabilistic serial mechanism (PS).
Random Serial Dictatorship Initially all items are marked unallocated. A random permutation of agents
is sampled and the agents are considered according to this order. Each agent is allocated his best item among
the unallocated items. This item henceforth is marked allocated.
Top Trading Cycle This appears in a paper by Shapley and Shubik [27] who attributed it to David Gale
and is applicable when the number of items equals the number of agents.
The algorithm starts with an arbitrary assignment σ of agents to items. This assignment, which is called
the initial endowment of agents, is independent of the preference orders of the agents. Subsequently, the
agents will trade among themselves to return the final allocation.
The algorithm then proceeds in rounds. Initially all agents are marked active. In each round, one
constructs a directed graph with the active agents as nodes. There is an arc from agent j to agent j′, if
the item σ(j′) is the top choice of agent j among the items owned by the active agents, that is, the set
{σ(j) : j active }. Note that each agent has out-degree exactly 1 (self loops are allowed and counted as both
out and in degree). Therefore, there exists at least one directed cycle in the graph. A cycle (self loops are
also cycles) is picked arbitrarily. For each arc (j, j′) in the cycle, we allocate agents j the item σ(j′). We
mark all agents in this cycle inactive and proceed to the next round. The algorithm stops when all agents are
marked inactive.
Probabilistic Serial This algorithm is due to Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7]. We describe the algorithm
when the number of agents, n, equals the number of items, m.
The algorithm first finds a fractional matching, that is, xijs for items i and agents j such that each
xij ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈[m] xij = 1 for all agents j, and
∑
j∈[n] xij = 1 for all items i. By the Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem, we can find a distribution on matchings such that the probability agent j is allocated
item i is exactly xij . This is the distribution returned by the algorithm.
The algorithm proceeds in rounds. Initially all xij’s are 0. For any item i, we denote its capacity as∑
j∈[n] xij . Any item with capacity strictly less than 1 is called unallocated. In each round, every agent
points to the best item among the unallocated items. For each unallocated item i we simultaneously raise
xij for all agents j that point to item i at the same rate. This continues till some unallocated item’s capacity
becomes 1. At this point we end the round and proceed to the next round. The algorithm terminates when
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all items are allocated. Since the procedure maintains that
∑
i∈[m] xij is the same for all agents j, at the end
we end up with a fractional matching.
A lot of literature exists on all three mechanisms; we point the reader to surveys [30, 1] for a detailed
reference. Before stating the rank approximations and lex truthfulness, let us mention some relevant known
facts. RSD is strongly truthful (in fact, it is universally truthful). TTCA is the only deterministic algorithm
among the three. It is known that for any initial endowment, the algorithm is truthful [27]. PS is known to
be weakly truthful and not strongly truthful [7]. Bhalgat et al [6] proved that the ordinal welfare factor (cf.
Section 1.2) of RS and PSD are 1/2, which is the best possible. The OWF of TTCA is 1/n, as can be seen
by considering the input where all agents have the same preference list.
Rank Approximations of RSD, TTCA, and PS We show that all three mechanisms have ‘bad’ rank
approximation. Rank approximation of TTCA is at least (n−1), while RSD and PS have rank approximation
of Ω(
√
n). Recall that MaxMatch has rank approximation 2.
We know that TTCA is deterministic and truthful. It is also non-bossy; if an agent changes his preference
but still gets the same item, it implies that in the round when he gets allocated an item, the cycle is the same
as before, since no other changes preferences. Therefore from Theorem 4.3, we get the rank approximation
is at least (n− 1).
Consider an instance ≻ with n agents and n items with preference lists as follows. Let k = ⌈√n⌉.
Agents 1 ≤ i ≤ k have item i as their top choice. Agents k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n have item n as their top choice.
These agents are now grouped into k groups G1, . . . , Gk, each group containing n/k − 1 agents. Agents in
group Gℓ have item ℓ as their second choice. All the other choices of all agents is immaterial and can be
assumed to be arbitrary. Observe that maxrank1(≻) = k + 1.
Let’s first take RSD and calculate the expected number of agents who get their top choice. With 1−k/n
probability, an agent k+1 ≤ j ≤ n shows up as the first agent; he picks item n. No other agent k+1 ≤ j ≤ n
gets his top choice. Henceforth, for any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, the probability that a guy in Gℓ shows up before agent ℓ
is at least 1− 2k
n
. If that occurs, then agent ℓ doesn’t get his top choice. Therefore, the expected number of
agents getting their top choice is at most 1+2k2/n+o(n). Thus, setting k = Θ(
√
n), the rank approximation
is Ω(
√
n).
In PS, the calculation is easier. For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, we get xℓℓ = 1n−k + kn
(
1− 1
n−k
)
= k−1
n
. For agent
k + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, we get xnℓ = 1n−k . Therefore, the expected number of agents getting their top choice in PS
is precisely 1 + k(k−1)
n
. Setting k = Θ(
√
n), we get that the rank approximation is Ω(
√
n).
We do not know if the rank approximation for RSD and PS is Θ(
√
n) or not.
Lex-Truthfulness of RSD, TTCA, and PS TTCA is truthful and RSD is universally truthful. Therefore,
they are lex-truthful as well. PS was shown to be weakly truthful by [7]. We show that in fact PS is lex-
truthful as well. The proof below is akin to the proof of weak truthfulness in [7] mentioned above; we
include it for completeness.
Theorem B.1. PS is lex-truthful.
Proof. Consider any preference profile ≻. By renaming items we may assume ≻j= (1, 2, . . . , n) for some
agent j. Suppose agent j misreports his preference as ≻′j 6=≻j , and let ≻′:= (≻′j ,≻−j). Let k be the first
position at which ≻j and ≻′j differ. That is, for r < k, alt(≻′j, r) = alt(≻j, r) = r. Note that j has
‘demoted’ k in the misreported preference, that is, pos(≻′j , k) > k. Let p and q be the distributions over
items that j obtains on reporting ≻j and≻′j respectively. Let x and x′ be the respective fractional matchings.
Observe that since PS has a notion of time (since xij’s are incremented at a certain rate), we can define
x(t) as the assignment at time t. So x(0) ≡ 0. Let t0 ≥ 0 be the time till which we have x(t0) ≡ x′(t0).
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If t0 is ill defined, then x ≡ x′ and so p ≡ q and there’s nothing to prove. We must have that till time t0,
agent j points to the same items in both runs, and right after that instant agent j points to different items in
the two runs. Say at t0, agent j pointed to item k in the original run, and k′ in the new run. Observe that all
items r < k have been completely allocated in both runs since j is pointing to k in the original run. Thus,
p(r) = q(r) for r < k since x(t0) ≡ x′(t0).
We claim p(k) > q(k). This will show p lexicographically dominates q. To do so, we need to introduce
some notation. Let t∗ and t′ be the times at which k is completely allocated in the original and new run
respectively. Let t1 be the time at which j points to k in the new run. Observe t0 < t1 ≤ t′. Also observe
that xjk = t∗ − t0 and x′jk = t′ − t1.
Now, if t′ ≤ t∗, we get xjk > x′jk, and we are done. So we may assume t′ > t∗. For t ≥ t0, let
S(t, k) and S′(t, k) be the set of agents pointing to item k at time t. Observe that PS satisfies the following
monotonicity condition: if an agent points to an item at time t, then he continues to do so till the item is
fully allocated. Using this, one can prove the following claim; we defer the proof to the end.
Claim B.2. For all t0 ≤ t < t1, |S′(t, k)| ≥ |S(t, k)| − 1, for t1 ≤ t < t∗, |S′(t, k)| ≥ |S(t, k)|, and for
t∗ ≤ t < t′, |S′(t, k)| ≥ |S(t∗, k)|.
Using the claim, we now show xjk > x′jk. Let C denote the capacity of item k at time t0. We know that
C < 1. Now, from the run of PS we get
∫ t∗
t0
|S(t, k)|dt = (1− C) =
∫ t′
t0
|S′(t, k)|dt (4)
Using the claim above and rearranging, we get
t0 − t1 ≤ −
∫ t′
t∗
|S(t∗, k)|dt
Now suppose |S(t∗, k)| = 1, that is, in the original run only one guy points to item k. This must be
agent j. This implies |S(t, k)| = 0 for t < t0, the time at which j points to k. In particular, we get C = 0,
and thus xjk = 1. We know that x′jk′ > 0 since j points to k′ 6= k in the new run. Therefore, x′jk < 1 since∑
k∈I xjk = 1. Thus, we may assume |S(t∗, k)| > 1, which implies that t0 − t1 < −(t′ − t∗). Thus,
x′jk = t
′ − t1 < t∗ − t0 = xjk. 
Proof of Claim B.2. In fact, we claim that for every item i 6= k, the subset S(t, i) ⊆ S′(t, i) for t0 ≤ t < t′.
This can be proved by induction. Suppose the claim is true at some time; it is true at time t0. The next
interesting time t is when some item is i is completely allocated in one of the runs. By our assumption, this
time t occurs in the new run since S′(t, i) ≥ S(t, i) for i 6= k. At this point the agents pointing to i point to
different items increasing their corresponding S′(t, ·)s. The same occurs in the original run albeit at a later
time say t′′; however, by monotonicity property S′(t′′, i) ⊇ S′(t, i), and therefore |S′(t′′, i)| ≥ |S(t′′, i)|.
For the item k, note that the above argument implies |S′(t, i) \ k| ≥ |S(t, i) \ k|, and then after t1, j enters
S′(t, k) as well. 
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